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Turning Anti-Discrimination Laws on their Head: Using Rhetoric to attempt to turn the
Medicine into the Illness
Introduction
Justice Scalia points out a “Kulturekampf” in his dissenting opinion in Romer v. Evans,1
referring to the battle between traditional moralists (often religious groups) and proponents of
anti-discrimination laws dealing with sexual orientation. One must appreciate the irony that five
years earlier, it was Justice Scalia who authored the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment
Division v. Smith.2 Smith arguably placed religious organizations on the defensive, resulting in
an abundance of rhetoric featuring claims that “religion is under attack” and that compliance
with anti-discrimination requirements is, in-and-of-itself, discrimination against religion.3 While
there may be colorable claims to such a statement when dealing with religious and whollyprivate expressive institutions in certain circumstances, applying the same arguments to antidiscrimination statutes in all circumstances is patently disingenuous. The modern rhetoric is
skilled at weaving a tapestry of justification for religious exceptions out of many different legal
threads. When one reaches the result, it looks coherent and sound, but upon closer scrutiny (or a
good wash) it falls to pieces. The recent case of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez4 highlights
how tangled the rationales have become and how the rhetoric of “attacks” and “discrimination by
anti-discrimination” has obscured the real legal arguments at issue.
Part I of this paper will attempt to explain the current state of the law as it relates to
regulations that have run up against the religious protections of the First Amendment in various

1

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3
See, e.g. Kristen Moulton, U. President: Mormons should join ACLU, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, April 4, 2011;
Alliance Defense Fund – The Homosexual Agenda: The Principal Threat to Your Religious Freedom,
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/Marriage (“There is no doubt that God’s plan for marriage is under an all-out,
full-scale attack by advocates of same-sex ‘marriage’ and the homosexual legal agenda.”); Morality in Media, On
the ‘Religious Right,’ We Too Have a ‘Blind Side’, CHRISTIAN NEWSWIRE, Dec. 29, 2009.
4
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
2
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situations. This examination will focus on the developments from Smith to Martinez and show
that there are distinct spheres in which the First Amendment protections must allow some “give.”
This part will be heavy on theory, but it is necessary to establish this framework to truly reach
the doctrinal analysis in the subsequent sections. Part II will examine the legal arguments and
rhetoric from religious organizations such as Christian Legal Society, and expose how their
misrepresentations and fundamentally flawed arguments work to obscure debate on the actual
legal issues. The analysis will focus primarily on the Martinez case as an example and include
other precedent and opinion which was expressed during the lead-up to the ultimate holding in
Martinez. This section will also highlight that starting at least as far back from the case of Boy
Scouts v. Dale,5 Christian Legal Society was planning on bringing such a suit as was at issue in
Martinez. One could intimate that by building up a stockpile of Court-sanctioned religiousexceptions, Christian Legal was looking to raise an issue of religious exception in a variety of
areas so that they might knit together the holdings into a jurisprudence of preferential exceptions
and circumvent the Court’s declaration in Smith. This section will conclude demonstrating how
effective the rhetoric of “religious exception” has permeated legal landscape, even when its use
is imprecise by analyzing an article by Dean Howarth of Michigan State College of Law. Part III
will take a step back from the narrow focus on Martinez and its forbearers, and examine how the
rhetoric has been employed to expand religious exemptions in the larger spheres, specifically in
state statutes regarding civil marriage. By framing the debate in the guise of “religious
protection” or “religious freedom,” anti-discrimination laws are being whittled away. Finally,
this paper will conclude reiterating that in approaching religious exemptions versus neutral, antidiscrimination laws, one must look to the proper sphere of First Amendment guarantees to gain
perspective on whether an exemption is or is not appropriate.
5

530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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Part I – Conceptualizing the Current State of the Law
“The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires.”6 The operative words used by the Court are “believe”
and “profess”, not “act on.” When it comes to the conduct and actions involved with the free
exercise of religion, the Court has never been so magnanimous.
This section will attempt to put free exercise into perspective in light of Supreme Court
decisions from Smith to Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.7 In approaching this analysis, the
conceptual model of spheres within spheres
seemed to provide a good structure for
establishing the current state of the law in
relation to absolute free exercise. Figure one is
a two-dimensional illustration.
The model requires a bit of mental
dusting and a mental trip back to high-school
physics. Imagine for a moment, a beam of
light. As it passes through each tinted sphere, it
not only bends, but dims a bit each time. Thus, someone standing at the center of the spheres
would see something much different than someone standing near the outer edge. Now replace
that beam of light with the concept of free exercise of religion. Outside the sphere of the State, it
exists absolutely, but crossing into these spheres changes the experience of free exercise as it

6
7

Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
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moves through the layers. Analysis of this model will begin with the outer sphere, representing
the federal Constitution and government’s effects on free exercise.

A.

The Outer Sphere – The Constitution & Federal Law
At the outer edge of this wide sphere, one can imagine that First Amendment rights are at

their apex. The only constraints that come to bear on one’s freedom of expression, association,
or free exercise of religion are those that would conflict with other portions of the Constitution.
As we move away from the edge, however, various federal statutes and regulations necessarily
come to bear on one’s behavior. Such conflicting interests are resolved by placing a difficult
burden on the Federal Government to justify any regulation that may infringe on the free
exercise right guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Federal Government may not infringe
on a person's free exercise of religion, "even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability," except if the Government satisfies a “compelling interest test” where it must show
that the infringement on free exercise rights is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."8
The outer sphere thus presents a minimum level of resistance to the free exercise of
religion, however existence in this sphere is conceptual rather than actual. When a question of
free exercise of religion is raised, it usually involves the state also exerting its authority.

8

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006), citing Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2006). This strict standard is a statutory creation.
Justice Scalia scorned the use of the compelling interest test when dealing with generally applicable laws when
writing for the majority in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)(discussed in more detail infra). He
stated that “[a]ny society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy…” Id.
Congress however, overrode the Court’s decision by passing RFRA, reinstating the application of the compelling
interest test. Analysis of the history of RFRA is beyond the scope of this paper, however it is important to note that
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court held that RFRA was not applicable against the
states. Therefore, while the Federal Government must satisfy the compelling interest test when defending a law of
general applicability that burdens the free exercise of religion, a state does not have the same burden, and the Smith
case is controlling.
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B.

The Intermediate Spheres – State Laws & Private Expressive Organizations
The United States’ federal system creates a tension between the powers of the states to

regulate the behaviors of their citizens while remaining in accord with federal constitutional
protections. This can be seen by the interaction (or lack thereof) between the state and the
private organization. The First Amendment of the United States’ Constitution9 bars states from
infringing on the speech and associative conduct of people and private expressive
organizations.10 Thus, private expressive organizations are protected by the Constitution from
many federal and state restrictions. The edge of the outer sphere sees a minimum amount of
resistance to free exercise, and entering the intermediate sphere of state regulation adds
additional burdens. Private expressive organizations, despite finding a Constitutional shield
from some state and federal laws, cannot be immune from all of them, and Employment Division
v. Smith provides an excellent example of how free exercise must necessarily bend.
In Smith, the respondents were fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation
organization after they had been charged with ingesting peyote, an illegal drug in the State of
Oregon, during a ceremony at the Native American Church.11 The respondents sued, ultimately
presenting the Supreme Court with the question of “whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the
reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug…”.12
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in response, answered that question in the
affirmative, stating that the “right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
9

The states also may also have First Amendment corollaries in their own constitutions.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), where the concept of the First Amendment being applicable
(incorporated) against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment was first stated by the Court.
11
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
12
Id.
10
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proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”13 To permit such
an exception would allow the respondents to use their religious motivation to place them
“beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice.”14
In essence, this would allow an individual “to become a law unto himself,” which the Court
found contradictory to both “constitutional tradition and common sense.”15 Justice Scalia
highlights this conclusion several times throughout the opinion: “We have never held that an
individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a
century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”16
A state impermissibly intrudes into the protections afforded by the Free Exercise clause,
however, when its regulations deviate from being neutral or generally applicable. The majority
points out that the exercising of religion can involve conduct such as “assembling for worship.”17
Should a state seek “to ban such acts… only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or
because of the religious belief that they display” it would be acting unconstitutionally.18 In such
a case, the practice of assembling for a religious purpose is set aside from assemblies for other
purposes and prohibited due to its religious component, a distinction that the First Amendment
forbids.
Smith thus sets a boundary for our intermediate sphere.19 A state must be able to regulate
the behavior of its citizenry, and if it incidentally burdens the exercise of religion through a
generally applicable, constitutional, and valid provision, the protections of the First Amendment
13

Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
15
Id. at 885.
16
Id. at 878-79.
17
Id. at 877.
18
Id.
19
As the light green portion of Figure One depicts.
14
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are not violated.20 Of course, this example is deceptively simple… it involves individuals and
the act at issue is one of drug use, behavior generally looked upon with disfavor. Complications
arise, for instance, when free exercise involves a group, is partnered with another First
Amendment right, such as freedom of association, or confronts a regulation which doesn’t garner
overwhelming popular support. In addition, states may try to regulate beyond their
Constitutional authority and reach too far into the private organizational sphere. It is here where
we find cases such as Boy Scouts v. Dale21 and Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston.22
In both Dale and Hurley, the state was attempting to enforce anti-discriminatory practices
on private expressive organizations through their public accommodations laws.23 Initially aimed
at physical places, the scope of public accommodation laws has expanded, and with that
expansion “the potential for conflict between state public accommodations laws and the First
Amendment rights of organizations has increased.”24 This area of uncertainty where state law
overlaps into private organizations’ sphere of autonomy has no clear boundary. The
controversies which arise from this realm will find their results extremely fact dependent. In
some cases, the state has not been seen overreaching when enforcing an antidiscrimination
provision of its public accommodation laws against a private organization. For example, the
Supreme Court found that a state had a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
women, and enforcement of the statutes was appropriate when it “would not materially interfere

20

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
22
515 U.S. 557 (1995). In Figure One, this would be depicted by the darker green portion of the sphere, where state
law tries to permeate more of the private organizations’ sphere.
23
In New Jersey, the statutes at issue were N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 10:5-5, 10:5-6; in Massachusetts, the statute at issue
was Mass. Gen. Laws § 272:98 (1992).
24
Dale, 530 U.S. at 657.
21
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with the ideas that the organization sought to express.”25 The decision, however, turned on the
function, philosophy, and how de facto “public” the organization was. In Dale and Hurley, the
murkiness of this realm is made even more evident by the courts’ disagreements about how to
define the organizations and how that affects the interaction between state authority and First
Amendment protections.26
In Hurley, a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendents of Irish immigrants formed
an organization, GLIB, to march in a St. Patrick’s Day parade organized by the South Boston
Allied War Veterans Council.27 The Council refused to admit GLIB as a parade contingent,
objecting to the perceived message – acceptance of non-heterosexual lifestyles – that GLIB’s
participation would convey.28 Both the lower court and Massachusetts’ Supreme Judicial Court
found the parade to fall under the statutory definition of a public accommodation, and thus could
not discriminate on the basis of sexual-orientation.29 The lower court rejected an argument by
the Council that the parade was private, and also stated it was “impossible to discern any specific
expressive purpose entitling the Parade to protection under the First Amendment.”30 The
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.31 Upon review, Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court,
stated that Massachusetts’ interpretation of its public accommodations law was applied in a

25

Id. at 657-58, citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) and Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
26
Note that in Hurley, free exercise is not the First Amendment guarantee at issue, rather the case deals more with
freedom of speech and assembly. Throughout all five of the main cases discussed in Part I (Gonzales, Smith,
Hurley, Dale, and Martinez), each shares a common theme where a public law collides with a philosophy that is
expressed by action. Whether this philosophy is defined as a religious belief or expressive association, the person or
persons who hold the belief claimed that their First Amendment rights were violated by the state. While the Court in
Hurley does not deem the parade “an expressive association,” it states in Dale that the analysis applied in both cases
is similar, and therefore Hurley is necessary to understanding the current state of the law. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
27
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 560.
28
See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574-75.
29
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 562.
30
Id. at 563.
31
Id. at 564.
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“peculiar way.”32 By those courts’ interpretation, “any contingent of protected individuals with a
message would have the right to participate in [the Council’s] speech, so that the communication
produced…would be shaped by all those protected by the law who wished to join in with some
expressive demonstration of their own.”33 Where Massachusetts went wrong, according to the
Court, is that it extended the reach of its public accommodations laws so far so as to turn the
Council’s speech itself into a public accommodation.34 While a state has broad powers of
regulation, there are limits to its reach. The Court holds that Massachusetts’ use of public
accommodation laws in this manner “violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”35
In Dale, a former Eagle Scout had his adult membership in the Boy Scouts revoked after
the Boy Scouts learned that he is “an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist.”36 Dale sued
the Boy Scouts, alleging that they had violated New Jersey’s public accommodations statute
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public
accommodation.”37 The Chancery Division of the New Jersey Superior Court determined that
the Boy Scouts “was not a place of public accommodation, and that, alternatively the Boy Scouts
is a distinctly private group exempted from coverage under New Jersey’s law.”38 This
interpretation would not be upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court, however, which reversed
the Chancery court holding that the Boy Scouts was a place of public accommodation, was not
exempt from the law, and had violated the law by revoking Dale’s membership based on his

32

Dale, 530 U.S. at 661, citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 661, citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
34
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
35
Id.
36
Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
37
Id. at 645.
38
Id.
33
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“avowed homosexuality.”39 Indeed, both courts had looked at the record and reached a different
conclusion about where the boundary lies for the public and private spheres. The Supreme Court
determined that the Boy Scouts’ “large size, nonselectivity, inclusive rather than exclusive
purpose, and practice of allowing non-members to attend meetings,” removed the organization
from being “sufficiently personal or private” so as to “warrant constitutional protection’ under
the freedom of intimate association.”40 Therefore, like Massachusetts, New Jersey has found that
a private organization has sufficiently drifted into the public sphere so as to subject it to
regulations from which it would otherwise be immune.
The Supreme Court, while unable to overturn the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
determination that the Boy Scouts is subject to New Jersey public accommodations laws,
nonetheless reiterates that the record revealed the “Boy Scouts is a private, nonprofit
organization.”41 And further, it is a private organization with an expressive purpose.42 As such,
the state’s laws must, except under compelling circumstances, bend to the protections of the First
Amendment rather than the reverse.43 “Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair

39

Id. at 646.
Id.
41
Dale, 530 U.S. at 649. The Court highlights that it believes the New Jersey Supreme Court overreached, that it
“went a step further and applied its public accommodations law to a private entity without even attempting to tie the
term ‘place’ to a physical location.” Id. at 657.
The Boy Scouts concede that Scouting has received “several benefits from government, including a federal charter,
the support of Presidents and members of Congress, access to some military facilities and equipment, use of public
buildings and spaces for meetings, and sponsorship of some Troops by government entitites.” Brief for Petitioner,
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)(No. 99-699), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 122 at *15. However
as the US Catholic Conference highlights in its Amicus brief, “In the era of pervasive government, every
organization that collaborates with government or participates in public programs is, therefore, under the lower
court’s approach, potentially a ‘place of public accommodation.’” Brief for United States Catholic Conference and
New Jersey Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000)(No. 99-699), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 131 at *8. The Supreme Court seems to agree.
42
Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
43
Id.
40
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the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express…
freedom of association plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.”44
The Court is careful to note that an expressive association cannot “erect a shield against
antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular
group would impair its message.”45 Again, there is a fact-based analysis to determine if the First
Amendment’s protections can be overridden by regulations “adopted to serve compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”46 Here, Dale is a self-professed leader in
his community who is open and honest about his sexual orientation.47 The implication being that
if Dale was not such a prominent “face” of a gay male scout, or was just “suspected” of being a
homosexual, that the discrimination would clearly be about his status which may have led the
Court to a different result. While the Court did not confront that question, it did reference
Hurley pointing out that “the parade holders did not wish to exclude the GLIB members because
of their sexual orientations, but because they wanted to march behind a GLIB banner.”48
Perhaps then, New Jersey’s public accommodations laws find no barrier in the First Amendment
when it comes to non-heterosexuals who make no effort to be “avowed.”
Hurley and Dale demonstrate that within the area in which public policy and First
Amendment freedoms collide is a zone where determining which side will prevail requires
careful scrutiny of the facts. It is relevant how the organization behaves – how “public” or
“private” it is, whether the organization has an expressive message, whether a state has
determined a compelling interest exists, the identity of the person or people who are trying to
44

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 653.
46
Id. at 648 (internal quotations omitted).
47
Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
48
Id.
45
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gain access or recognition by the organization, etc. What is clear, however, is that the Court is
making its best effort to ensure that a balance is maintained between the competing interests.

C.

The Inner Spheres – The University Setting and Its Organizations
The inner spheres for the purpose of this paper consist of the public university and its

student organizations. Set firmly within the state’s authority, it nonetheless is no stranger to
controversies about institution policy and First Amendment protections.
In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the Court was faced with a suit by the Christian
Legal Society (CLS) against the University of California’s Hastings Law School.49 CLS alleged
that Hastings’ requirement that it accept any student as a member in order to become a
“Recognized Student Organization (RSO)” violated its First Amendment rights to free exercise
and freedom of association.50 The crux of CLS’s complaint turned on the fact that it would have
to accept members that may not share the organization’s beliefs on religion and sexual
orientation in order to obtain the benefits of RSO status.51
Part of the Court’s decision resembles the outcome seen Smith. Justice Ginsburg, writing
for the majority, states that an “all-comers condition on access to RSO status, in short, is
textbook viewpoint neutral,” and holds it to be “a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on
access to the student-organization forum.”52 Recall the similar language in Smith: “We have
never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”53

49

Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
Id. at 2978-79.
51
Id. at 2978.
52
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2993, 2978.
53
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. Intriguingly, Justice Scalia, the author of the Smith decision, joined the dissent in
Martinez. Unfortunately he did not compose the opinion and therefore it is not clear if he now disfavors Smith.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting).
50
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The other component of the Court’s decision turns on the position of public universities
within our theoretical spheres-model. A public university is not synonymous with the state in its
relationship to individuals within its bounds. Open spaces within a university’s control are not
deemed equivalent to the parks and streets and therefore “First Amendment rights… must be
analyzed in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.”54 The edge of the
university’s sphere thus begins to take form. Whereas the state must permit speech and forms of
expression to all groups, the Court has recognized that a university has a right “to exclude even
First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with
the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.”55 Therefore, in the “limited public
forums” that the university may choose to make available within its bounds, it may “reserve[] it
for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”56
At the very center of the spherical model would find the classroom, where it is virtually
undisputed that the protections of the First Amendment would be at their most dim, but rightfully
so. A university must be able to exert control over the conduct that takes place in its facilities
and its curricula. Taking a slight step back, however, shows us that the limited public forum
would be the outermost ring of this innermost sphere. Here, an expressive organization would be
able to exist with the minimum amount of interference from the university, barring neutral timeplace-manner restrictions. Sandwiched between this ring and the classroom sphere, however, is
the “recognized” student organization sphere… a place where the university can impose neutral
restrictions or requirements in exchange for granting of special privileges.

54

Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2988 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n. 5 (1981)).
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277.
56
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). Both Widmar and Rosenberger were cited by
the Court in Martinez in regards to the “limited public forum” theory, but will be discussed in more detail in Part II.
55
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In any event, existence in these innermost spheres is clearly distinct from the private
organization sphere. A student or group of students has the option to form groups outside of the
university sphere where First Amendment protections are more rigorous. Under this method of
analysis, the legal basis of the Court’s decisions appear much more straightforward than the
current climate of debate would seem to convey. Groups like CLS have attempted—and for the
most part successfully managed—to obscure the true legal debate by falsely equating
circumstances occurring within different spheres and framing any attempt to regulate in and
among the accepted spheres as “attacks” on religion.

Part II: Rhetoric as a Tool of Obfuscation and Confusion
“In courtrooms and schoolrooms, offices and shops, public buildings and even churches… those
who believe in God are increasingly threatened, punished, and silenced.”57
“If homosexuals succeed, “all people – especially Christians – who do not affirm homosexual
behavior could be silenced, punished, and possibly even jailed for so-called discrimination and
intolerance.”58
The quotations above provide a small sampling of how groups such as CLS are
attempting to frame conflicts between civil regulations and religious practices as “attacks.” CLS
indicated in its amicus brief for the Dale case that the cause of their defensive rhetoric stemmed
in part from the Smith decision: “After this Court’s restriction of exemptions for religious
persons from neutral, generally applicable laws, in Employment Division v. Smith,… , religious
persons and organizations are vulnerable to such attacks.”59
What CLS either does not want to accept, refuses to confront, or perhaps hopes will
escape notice, is that far from “attacks,” curtailments of religious free exercise have always
57

Alliance Defense Fund – Defending Religious Freedom in America,
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/ReligiousFreedom (last visited May 15, 2011).
58
Id.
59
Brief for Christian Legal Society, et. al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000)(No. 99-699), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 156 at *5 [hereinafter CLS Amicus Brief].
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occurred, and vary depending on the surrounding circumstances. The language employed
however, adopts the position that religious free exercise is absolute,60 something that every case
cited in this comment has refuted.61 Nonetheless, CLS and its brethren plod forward with
rhetoric and disingenuous legal arguments, perhaps hoping it will create a movement to overturn
Smith, and impose preferential exceptions. To illustrate, this section will examine more closely
the argument put forward by CLS in the Martinez case as well as in its amicus brief from the Boy
Scouts v. Dale case, as that brief almost resembles a complaint which could have been filed in
this case, dealing with university anti-discrimination policies and their danger to religious freeexercise.62

A. Mere Puffery or Deliberately Misleading?
Exaggeration and hyperbole can be a useful in a debate, but CLS has taken these tools to
the extreme. In his oral argument before the Supreme Court, CLS Attorney Michael McConnell
opened with the statement that under Hastings’ policy “a student who does not even believe in
the Bible is entitled to demand to lead a Christian Bible study…”63 This contention is not
remotely true. Hastings’ policy requires that any student be able to seek a leadership position in

60

For example, statements such as “… a group may object to governmental coercion -- or at best, governmental
bribery -- to disaffirm, in effect, their commitment to particular religious convictions.” CLS Amicus Brief, supra
note 59, at *16.
61
See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988) (“When the government makes policies and laws, it “cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.”).
62
CLS Amicus Brief, supra note 59.
63
Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371)
[hereinafter Martinez Transcript] (emphasis added). Further, in the organization bylaws as to the CLS Thomas
Cooley Law School chapter, there is no requirement that mere members are entitled to lead prayer. Thomas Cooley
Christian Legal Society website, available at:
http://christianlegalsociety.tmc.cooley.edu/Default.aspx?pageId=154288 (last visited May 2, 2011). Thus, the
contention that Hastings is forcing the organization to be led by homosexuals or non-Christians is without any basis.
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a “Registered Student Organization (RSO)”64 but it does not deny the organization the right to
set neutral qualification requirements.65 For instance, several RSOs already condition
membership and leadership eligibility through neutral polices which are “designed to ensure that
students join because of their commitment to a group’s vitality, not its demise.”66 Examples of
acceptable requirements include: attending meetings regularly, payment of dues, attendance
requirements, and minimum membership time requirements to be eligible for an officer
position.67 What it definitely doesn’t say is that any student can walk into an organization and
demand leadership. Even after the decision came down in favor of Hastings, the CLS remained
firm in its rhetoric, releasing a press release stating that the “Hastings policy actually requires
CLS to allow atheists to lead its Bible studies and the College Democrats to accept the election
of Republican officers in order for the groups to be recognized on campus.”68

B. Legal Fallacies
Beyond just the social rhetoric, looking at the actual legal arguments raised by CLS also
calls into question their candor. Most egregious is their refusal to take into account
circumstances when applying case law. For example, in their amicus brief for Dale, CLS alleged
that “…in the post-Smith legal framework, the right of Boy Scouts to select its leadership
according to its own criteria will directly affect the ability of religious student groups to select
their leadership free from government coercion.”69 The Martinez decision shows that this
contention is facially flawed, but the basis of the analogy itself is incorrect. As Part I illustrated,
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the Boy Scouts exist in a sphere of regulation and free expression quite different from that of a
student organization at a university. At issue in Boy Scouts was state regulation of a private
expressive organization, not university regulation of a university student organization. While
CLS may try to obscure this fact, it is not a distinction without a difference. At oral argument,
CLS stated that “[t]he State is Hastings. We are perfectly private."70 This is simply not accurate.
Student organizations, while they resemble (or even have the same name as) a private expressive
organization outside of the university sphere, do not transform them into the same being.71 The
University is itself a restrictive organization that does not take every person who may wish to
attend. It selects a certain group from the general population to participate in academic studies,
and attempts to provide an educational atmosphere for attendees. “A college’s commission -and its concomitant license to choose among pedagogical approaches -- is not confined to the
classroom, for extracurricular programs are, today, essential parts of the educational process.”72
Universities, therefore, often encourage students to form organizations to discuss differing
philosophies and express diverse opinions. While universities traditionally do this, it is not a
right of students. A university is not a fortress or a prison that confines its attendees. The
Students are free to come and go from the campus, and are able not constrained from joining
local chapters of organizations such as CLS. It is a convenience that students form their own
versions of such organizations on campuses. CLS, nonetheless, wishes to liken the relationship
between the state and the national CLS with that of the University and Student-Org CLS. This
would obviate the University as a player in its own home.
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What a university cannot do is discriminate on the basis of viewpoint if it has opened a
limited public forum within its bounds.73 CLS, foreshadowing the case eventually brought
against Hastings, alleged in its amicus brief for Dale that:
public universities have threatened religious student groups with loss of access to campus
facilities if the groups refuse to agree to accept as officers persons who do not share the
groups’ core religious values, including their religious viewpoints regarding homosexual
conduct.74
This statement again expresses the untruth that any university is attempting to force any specific
students into officer positions. More important, however, is that CLS offered no examples at this
time of any university that actually engaged in this practice, and would not file a complaint
against Hastings for several years to come. The cases CLS does point to, however, offer no
support for this statement as constructed. CLS cites Widmar v. Vincent75 and Rosenberger v.
University of Virginia76 as support for why such “behavior” by universities is forbidden, however
these cases deal with issues that are fundamentally different than the concept CLS is attempting
to advance.
In Widmar, for example, the issue was that the university, “which makes its facilities
generally available for the activities of registered student groups” subsequently closed its
facilities to a “registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and
religious discussion.”77 The aggrieved organization was already an approved organization which
had been operating for several years and had complied with all university policies.78 The Court
determined, therefore that the discrimination was based on the viewpoint of organization, their
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religious speech.79 The regulation was not neutral on its face, it prohibited “the use of University
buildings or grounds for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”80 This
demonstrates that a university cannot open its doors to all student organizations and then
subsequently shut one out for what they choose to discuss,81 but it doesn’t confront any issues of
organization leadership nor antidiscrimination regulations.
In Rosenberger the university authorized student organizations to contract with outside
printers for publications but “withheld any authorization for payments on behalf of petitioners
for the sole reason that their student paper ‘primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in
or about a deity or an ultimate reality.’”82 The student group was designated a “Contracted
Independent Organization,” a status which distinguished it from a “religious organization,” yet it
was denied funding because it espoused a religious viewpoint.83 As in Widmar, the Court said
the university could not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.84
Both cases remain good law today, and are important for protecting student organizations
from arbitrary regulations that target their speech for regulation. What CLS would like these
cases to express, is that religious expression deserves special protection within the university
sphere. CLS cites both Widmar and Rosenberger in their arguments against Hastings’ policy.85
As previously described, the situations are factually distinguishable. In both Widmar and
Rosenberger, the organization experiencing viewpoint discrimination was already a university-
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certified organization.86 Therefore, it had achieved equal status to the other organizations yet
was still being treated dissimilar. Widmar did not establish a right for a religious student
organization to exist, but instead that if a religious student organization does exist, it must be
treated the same as all other student organizations. This is the key distinction which CLS hopes
to avoid in Martinez, where it is asking to be made equivalent to a RSO without abiding by the
same rules… as Justice Ginsburg states “CLS, it bears emphasis, seeks not parity with other
organizations, but a preferential exemption from Hastings’ policy.”87
What CLS also wishes to ignore that in both decisions is that the Court consistently stated
that the university may limit its forum, “reserving it for certain groups of for the discussion of
certain topics.”88 Where a university runs into trouble with viewpoint discrimination is where it
has opened up a forum and subsequently attempts to manage the messages on an ad hoc basis.89
Hastings, perhaps with a slight bit of irony, has not opened up its forums to all-comers. Some
means of communication with students and methods of conducting group activities on the
campus are subject to a threshold commitment that the group not discriminate on the basis of
several enumerated statuses.90 If a group does not wish to abide by the threshold requirements, it
may not participate in certain forums, but may in others that are open to all-comers.91 Hastings
stated to the Court, that “the school would be pleased to provide CLS the use of Hastings
facilities for its meetings and activities” should it choose to remain unrecognized, as well as
allow it “access to chalkboards and generally available campus bulletin boards to announce its
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events.”92 In this respect, the Court noted that “Hastings would do nothing to suppress CLS’s
endeavors, but neither would it lend RSO-level support for them.”93
C.

“Religious Exception” Fallacy Gaining Traction
The language that has been employed of “religious exception” is used repeatedly,

although as has been described, “exception” is something of a misnomer. In the cases involving
student organizations, the First Amendment is not being invoked as a shield to protect the
organization’s message, but is rather used as a sword to attack rules which bind everyone else.
The “exception” desired is not to protect an organization’s right to speak or assemble, but the
right to obtain a preferred status without playing by the rules. Nonetheless, organizations have
been very effective in framing their message as one of defense and “exceptions.” They have
found support from well-learned quarters who also fall into the trap of defending “exceptions” by
conflating the spheres of First Amendment protections.
Joan Howarth, the Dean of Michigan State University College of Law, for example, takes
such a position in her article, “Teaching Freedom: Exclusionary Rights of Student Groups.”94 In
this article, Dean Howarth states that nondiscrimination policies of the school should not trump
expressive association rights.95 While I have demonstrated that student group First Amendment
rights would fall in the inner spheres, Dean Howarth supports her conclusion by citing to cases
which occur outside of the University sphere.96 Further, Dean Howarth virtually ignores the fact
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that what CLS sought from UC Hastings was not merely freedom of expression, but wanted
“recognized status,” which would allow them access to subsidies, etc. She states that “in a
limited public forum created to allow students to form groups on the basis of shared beliefs,
preventing faith-based groups from using their beliefs to organize a group should not be
dismissed as viewpoint neutrality.”97 However, such consideration by the Court is consistent
with its limited public forum precedent, and is consistent with Hastings’ behavior. Dean
Howarth later points out that Hastings “never interfered with the chapter’s existence until it
refused to sign the nondiscrimination policy.”98 It was permitted to hold bible studies,
barbeques, etc., but it was not allowed “recognized” status.99 This is an important distinction.
Dean Howarth’s argument clearly breaks down where she states that “when a school or
university establishes a limited public forum for student organizations, the student organizations
constitute private entities, with identities distinct and separate from that of the school or
university.”100 This is contradicted by the very nature of a “student organization,” which seeks
to define itself both by its mission, as well as the fact it is tied to the University within which it
operates. A student organization does not seek to be “distinct” from the University, but to define
itself as part of it… otherwise, there would be no need to form an organization within a
University at all. A group could merely form outside of the campus and visit the limited public
forum as it wished. To emphasize separation, Dean Howarth suggests that the university
“provide specific disclaimers that … alert everyone that student organization are not within the
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general nondiscrimination policies for access to educational opportunities.”101 Dean Howarth
again misses the point of what CLS is seeking. They were already in a position where they were
allowed to discriminate and still have access to campus facilities, what they wanted, and what
their suit involved, was a request for less separation.102 They wanted a status which allowed
them to use Hastings’ name, and would use student monies to subsidize their events.103
As we have seen, the Martinez Court did not follow the reasoning of CLS nor Dean
Howarth, and instead maintained consistency with its prior holdings. It is evident, however, that
when the complicated area of nested spheres of First Amendment jurisprudence come into play,
they are made more obscure and convoluted by emotion-provoking rhetoric. What CLS puts
forth as a legal argument, and what Dean Howarth perhaps inadvertently supports, is that
religious beliefs deserve special treatment under the Constitution. This is clearly against not
only the language of precedent but also the spirit of the cases as well. With a success in the
university setting, combined with the successes of Dale and Hurley, it seems that CLS was
attempting to gather holdings permitting preferential exceptions in a variety of spheres. While
speculative, it would appear that CLS hoped to be able to weave these holdings into a broader
argument for religious exemptions to anti-discrimination laws at all levels, in essence nullifying
Smith. CLS did not obtain such a victory, however the kulturekampf was not being waged on
just the judicial front. In Part III, we will take a step back from the university sphere and take a
broader look at how religious protection rhetoric is being codified, which will add credence to
the speculation that an effort to nullify anti-discrimination laws through a religious “opt-out” is,
in fact, occurring.
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Part III: Kulturekampf and Rhetoric beyond the University Sphere

In the last few years, several of the New England states have passed laws codifying the
right of “civil marriage” for same-sex couples.104 In the four states that codified the right to
same-sex marriage in 2009, and in the proposed 2011 legislation in Maryland, however, each bill
contains a “religious freedom” provision. In fact, in Vermont and Maine, the bills themselves
contained “religious freedom” in the titles.105
Maine’s now void law, and the New Hampshire law both are affirm protections for clergy
to be immune from any suit for refusing to solemnize a same-sex marriage.106 This “protection”
seems largely a tautology as the state has never had the authority to reach into a religious
organization and demand it provide a sacrament to all-comers. If that were a valid fear, the rise
of civil divorce would pose a much greater threat to religious institutions’ marriage sacraments.
However, as all religious institutions’ clergy are free to discriminate against those who have
civilly divorced on the basis of religious doctrine, it does not stand to reason that they would be
unable to turn away same-sex couples seeking marriage if it also was contrary to doctrine. In
fact, such language as that within the Maine and New Hampshire bills appears to be aimed at
quelling the rhetoric which we have seen throughout this paper.107
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While Part II described student organizations seeking “religious exceptions” to gain
access to preferred status at universities, in the outer spheres, the “religious protections” sought
can have a substantially more insidious results. In fact, aside from “affirming” religious
freedom, they seemed aimed at creating broader “religious exceptions” not only for marriage
ceremonies but reaching into anti-discrimination laws as well.108 In Connecticut and Vermont’s
laws, and in Maryland’s proposed bill, the language differs slightly as to the religious
“protections,” but all three exceed the mere iteration that the laws will leave the “clergy” free to
discriminate. The three all apply to “a religious organization, association, or society, or any
nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with
a religious organization, association, or society.”109 Additionally, Connecticut and Vermont state
that these organizations “shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages,
facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if the request for such services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to the solemnization of a marriage or
celebration of a marriage.”110 Maryland’s “related to” language includes solemnization as well
as any “promotion of marriage” events which may occur “through religious programs,
counseling, educational courses, summer camps, and retreats.”111 This language is significantly
more encompassing than is necessary to assure religious institutions that the state is not going to
interfere with their doctrines. In fact, what it appears to do is give a preferential exception to
those religious (and religious affiliated) groups which have taken a step into the public sphere.
Again, we have a situation where the First Amendment has become a sword instead of shield.
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Rather than protect the religious organization from overreach by the state, we now have religious
organizations expanding into the public sphere but refusing to accept the rules which bind other
non-religious yet similarly situated organizations and people. Beyond the churches, synagogues,
mosques, etc., these statutes create questions as to where the boundaries of “exemptions” lie.
How much “association” is required to invoke the exemption, for example? How is a nonprofit
operated “in conjunction with” a religious organization defined? And when a religious
institution owns housing, or rents facilities to the market at large, have they been given a pass to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation? Professor Taylor Flynn of Western New England
College School of Law, has pointed out some of the dangers he sees lurking in the religious
“freedom” language proposed for the civil marriage bills.112 He believes that the language being
employed is a departure from centuries of practice where religious freedom would cede ground
“to equality in the public realm.”113 Thus, if someone wished to take enter the commercial
environment, they could not bring their biases with them into the marketplace. What appears to
be the goal of these religious freedom clauses today, however, is to reverse this practice. By
building in exceptions, individuals such as same-sex couples could be “required to conform their
lives to others’ religious beliefs as a condition of their equal participation in the marketplace.”114
It is the same movement from a private sphere into a public sphere with a demand to play by
different rules that we saw in the university context in Martinez but with a broader effect.
In an effort to appease the loud voices calling out that same-sex marriage “violates”
religious freedom, people like Maryland State Senator Jamie Raskin are determined to make sure
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that civil marriage bills also reflect the “main value” of “absolute religious freedom.”115 But this
“absolute freedom” is no longer for clergy or within religious practices, it is expanding into the
public sphere. The judicial branch has shown that private expressive organizations such as the
Boy Scouts, are protected from state law overreach, which implies that more clearly “religious”
oriented organizations would find more First Amendment protection without express statutory
provision for exemptions. Nonetheless, these exemptions are being added, and they extend
beyond the merely “expressive” private organizations. The truly disturbing legal trend is not
what church leaders have called “the ominous creep of laws allowing same-sex marriage,”116 but
rather that religious organizations are taking themselves into the public sphere and then
demanding religious “exemptions” from neutral laws such as anti-discrimination statutes. The
kulturekampf is not a battle where only one side seeks to advance. It appears that what may have
been CLS’ goal through the judicial path has found more success in the reverse direction along
the political path.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has laid out a framework to demonstrate that the protections of the First
Amendment will interact differently with anti-discrimination regulations depending upon context
and circumstances. A university organization, for example, is not on par with a private
organization outside the university context, both occupy distinct spheres of being. Therefore the
rights of students in a limited public forum are not equivalent to an individual in a private
expressive organization operating in a public forum. Nonetheless, there has been a great deal of
effort made to conflate these spheres and develop a jurisprudence and social parlance of
“religious exceptions” and “religious protections.” Justice Scalia mentioned a “Kulturekampf”
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in his Romer v. Evans dissent,117 and we have seen that there is, indeed, one being waged. From
the Court’s pronouncement in Smith that religious organizations must comply with neutral laws,
there has been steady movement by religious organizations to escape its binds. This paper
demonstrated that while often the terminology frames the issue as religion “under attack” and in
need of a protecting “exception,” in fact, the goal can be for special status or preferred treatment
without abiding by neutral regulations. To be sure, it is not the intent of this paper to dismiss all
calls for religious exemptions as fraudulent. There are cases where laws can overreach into the
private expressive organization’s sphere, but the Supreme Court has demonstrated its willingness
to stop such encroachments.
Courts, governments, and legal minds must be vigorous in scrutinizing calls for “religious
exceptions” as the rhetoric of the last decade has worked to obscure the logical legal framework
that is in place. Instead, the rhetoric appeals to emotion and creates the idea that somehow antidiscrimination laws are infiltrating the private sphere and “attacking” religion, rather than only
applying when religion takes a step into the public sphere. Martinez suggests that the Court will
also restrain attempts of religious exemption encroachment the other direction as well, but there
is still the concern that the anti-discrimination laws of the state will still be circumvented by
rhetoric aimed at the political arena. In the same breath that states are recognizing same-sex
marriage, there is a risk that other anti-discrimination statutes are being undermined in the name
of “religious freedom.” As Justice Scalia stated in Smith, the Court has never held that “when
otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions
but the conduct itself must be free from government regulation.”118 While there may be
resistance within private religious organizations to the anti-discrimination protections afforded to
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homosexuals, they cannot be allowed to alter the legal landscape under the guise of First
Amendment protection. To do so is to open the floodgates for constitutionally sanctioned
discrimination.
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